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On Paul Ricoeur’s Unwritten Project of an Ontology of 
Place 
 





In this paper I would like to venture certain assumptions on what could 
be a consequential ontology of place, as sketched from a – probably 
unconventional and somewhat free – reading of Ricoeur’s debate with 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit on the subject of temporality, resumed in the 
third part of La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. The challenge is now to try to 
conceive of an ontology of place at the same level as the ontology of 
historicity, which Ricoeur begins to unfold in the way I have identified. 




The surprising subtitle of Interpreting Nature, a 2004 book edited by F. 
Clingerman, B. Treanor, M. Drenthen, and D. Utsler, announces the 
‘emergent field of environmental hermeneutics’ (Clingerman, Treanor, 
Drenthen, Utsler, 2014). In its most robust sense, the editors argue, 
this “new” field of hermeneutic research should be understood as ‘a 
philosophical stance which understands how the inevitability of what 
Gadamer called our ‘hermeneutical consciousness’ informs our 
relationship with environments’ (4). More precisely, this field of research 
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is organized around a double fundamental concern: the application of 
hermeneutic principles to the interpretation of environments (natural, 
cultural, territorial, political, historical, etc.) where human life takes 
place, and research into an ontological framework for interpreting the 
human way of mediating the meaning of place.   
Whether we should speak of this as an “emergent field” rather than 
a constitutive dimension of hermeneutics is open to debate. Yet the 
interest of this kind of proposal – one that calls attention to 
environments and, consequently, to the spatial side of the human 
condition – is unquestionable. In this paper, I would like to discuss a 
specific part of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical project, where he offers us 
decisive suggestions for how to conceive of a hermeneutic account of 
human space. I will focus my analysis on selected sections in La 
mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, with the aim of trying to understand (with 
Ricoeur, but also beyond Ricoeur) the importance of concepts such as 
space, place, environment, architecture, and urbanism in the context of 
Ricoeur’s philosophical project.  
 
2. Emplacements 
It is in La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli that Ricoeur, talking about the 
“spatial side” (Ricoeur, 2004: 148) of the relation between memory and 
history, clearly proposes that three irreducible axes of a “hermeneutic 
rationalization” of the idea of place are central to his analysis. The first 
is the axis of a “phenomenology of place”, which Ricoeur locates in the 
works of E. Casey, whose analysis is indebted to M. Merleau-Ponty’s 
revolutionary work on the body’s lived spatiality. The second axis is 
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developed by a ‘hermeneutic of the built space’1 insofar as Ricoeur, in a 
very interesting paper titled ‘Architecture et narrativité’ (Ricoeur, 1998: 
44–51) ‘tried to transpose to the architectural plane the categories 
linked to threefold mimesis in the first volume of […] Time and 
Narrative: prefiguration, configuration, refiguration’ (Ricoeur, 2004: 
527n). Finally, according to Ricoeur, a higher level of rationalization of 
place, which we might call the axis of a “long duration” geo-politics of 
inhabited land, is unfolded by examining the question of whether 
geography might be to space as history is to time (in the same sense 
that narrative and architecture are analogous and mutually 
corresponding ways of accessing and creating human time and human 
space, respectively). Following the original idea of a “geo-history” 
(suggested by Vidal de la Blanch and pursued by the momentous 
developments of the School of the Annals) up to the point where it 
changes into a geo-politics of long duration (exemplified in Braudel’s 
works on the Mediterranean), Ricoeur is here interested in the way lived 
space is reconstructed (by relations of commerce, by political projects, 
military endeavours, agricultural choices, types of communities, ethnic 
traditions, religious habits, etc.) at the hyper-geometrical level of the 
“oikoumene”2.  
It is precisely at this point of his analysis that Ricoeur adds the 
following provocative and surprizing suggestion: ‘One could pursue this 
                                                          
1 I have studied several philosophical variations of the first two axes in: Umbelino, 
2016; Id., 2016a; Id., 2013; Id., 2011. 
2 ‘In conclusion, from the phenomenology of “places” that beings of flesh and blood 
occupy, leave, lose, rediscover — in passing through the intelligibility belonging to 
architecture — up to the geography that describes an inhabited space, the discourse of 
space too has traced out an itinerary thanks to which lived spaced is turn by turn 
abolished by geometrical space and reconstructed at the hyper-geometrical level of the 
oikoumene’ (Ricoeur, 2004: 153). 
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odyssey of turn by turn lived, constructed, traversed, and inhabited 
space by an ontology of ‘place,’ at the same level as the ontology of 
historicity that we shall consider in part 3 of this work’ (582n). What 
might such an ontology be?  
The expression “at the same level” is in my view crucial: it would be 
fairly safe to begin by saying that Ricoeur is suggesting that both an 
ontology of place and an ontological hermeneutics addressed to the 
historical condition come together in ‘any attempt to characterize the 
mode of being that we are, in each case in opposition to the mode of 
being characterizing beings other than ourselves, whatever the ultimate 
relation of this being to Being may be’ (344). Given that the mode of 
being that we are is characterized both by the “power to remember” 
(Ib.)(pouvoir faire mémoire) and the ability to “write” history, it could 
be added that spatiality (in the broad sense of the fabric of 
environments and places) is as fundamental to and constitutive of our 
historical fabric – understood as res gestae et historia rerum gestarum3 
– as temporality. But how so?  
Allow me to venture certain assumptions on what could be a 
consequential ontology of place, as sketched from a – probably 
unconventional and somewhat free – reading of Ricoeur’s debate with 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit on the subject of temporality, resumed in the 
third part of La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli4. It is a complex discussion: 
Ricoeur does not hide his debt to Heidegger, yet it seems that he 
somehow takes that debt as a philosophical motive to clearly show, 
                                                          
3 ‘We make history and we make histories because we are historical’ (349). 
4 It is of course true that very few thinkers have thought profoundly about the nature 
of place more than Heidegger; I believe, however, that our thoughts on place can 
profit from Ricoeur’s controversial assessment. 
Critical Hermeneutics, 1 (2017) 
237 
despite his closeness to Heidegger, his “reservations” regarding key 
aspects of Sein und Zeit.  
An initial point of disagreement has to do with what Ricoeur 
considers to be, at the centre of Heidegger’s existential analytic of 
Dasein (and regarding his famous analysis of the concept of care) an 
insufficient account of the importance of a 'very particular existential 
that is the flesh, the animate body, my own body, as Husserl had begun 
to develop this notion in his last works in line with the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation’ (345). This notion is decisive for developing a meditation on 
death and birth, but most of all in accounting for “the between” upon 
which Heidegger constructs his idea of historicity. In this sense, 
according to Ricoeur, only the development of an analysis of our 
incarnated way of being can help us to understand this “between”, as it 
entails ‘bridging the logical gulf hollowed out by the hermeneutics of 
Dasein between the existentials gravitating around the centre of care 
and the categories in which the modes of being of things’, objectively 
present (vorhanden) or handy (zunhanden), ‘are related’ (Ib.). 
A second precaution taken by Ricoeur regarding Heidegger’s 
analysis has to do with the following central idea, developed in Being 
and Time (an idea that Ricoeur himself shares): the notion that time is a 
metacategory of the same order as care, in keeping with a philosophical 
anthropology of the capable human being. As Ricoeur puts it, ‘[c]are is 
temporal, and time is the time of care’ (346). The problem is that time, 
in philosophical terms, has always been a source of aporetical 
discourses, and it is not guaranteed that Heidegger’s critique of the 
“vulgar” category of time is sufficient to overcame those aporetical 
perspectives in favour of a conception of authentic human temporality. 
Ricoeur’s solution is, as I have discussed elsewhere (see apud n. 4), to 
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consider narrative as a way of accessing “human time”, only to be found 
at the point or rupture and suture between lived time and cosmological 
time. 
A third worry concerns Heidegger’s thought-provoking choice to 
place the main accent of his approach on the future and not on the 
present. ‘Under the province of care, in Heidegger, ‘being ahead of 
oneself’ becomes the pole of reference for the entire analysis of 
temporality, with its heroic connotation of “anticipatory resoluteness”’ 
(Ricoeur, 2004: 347) and its focus on being-towards-death. One can, 
nevertheless, according to Ricoeur, resist the hierarchizing of time that 
comes along with the suggestion that an orientation toward the future 
would be ‘more authentic and more original’ (348) than an orientation 
toward the past and the present. It is Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity that is clearly at stake here, and more precisely its auto-
referential dimension, which Ricoeur is trying to dismiss in order to think 
of historicity without privileging any one dimension of time over the 
others.  
In fact – and this is a fourth consideration made by Ricoeur 
regarding Heidegger’s analysis – in addition to the new manner of 
ordering the threefold division of temporal experience, Heidegger 
proposes ‘an original hierarchical ordering of the modes of 
temporalization’ (Ib.), starting from the future and going back to the 
past, understood as a progressive loss of ‘authenticity’, as a ‘descent 
from the authentic to the inauthentic’ (Jervolino, 2002: 63). Ricoeur 
does not share this perspective as he considers that what Heidegger 
calls ‘authenticity here lacks any criterion of intelligibility’ (Ricoeur, 
2004: 349) and remains but a self-referential term. By contrast, Ricoeur 
proposes a conception of the equal dignity of the three instances and 
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levels of time, as expressing the potentialities of the embodied and 
intersubjective capable human being.   
This is the only way, Ricoeur argues, to overcame the confrontation 
between the ontology of historical being and the epistemology of 
history, something that Heidegger’s discourse, ‘succumbing to what 
Adorno denounced as the jargon of authenticity’ (Ib.), does not allow. 
Heidegger could have saved himself from this jargon, which tends to 
couple “authenticity” with the “primordial”, ‘if by historical condition he 
was to understand, in accordance with what the expression suggests, an 
existential condition of the possibility of the entire series of discourses 
concerning the historical in general, in everyday life, in fiction, and in 
history’ (Ib.). If we make history and we make histories, this is precisely 
‘because we are historical’; this is the ‘because of existential 
conditionality’ upon which it is finally possible to ‘organize an order of 
derivation that would not be reduced to a progressive loss of ontological 
density but that would be marked by increasing determination on the 
side of epistemology’ (Ib.). In other words, in each confrontation 
between the ontology of the historical condition and the historical 
knowledge that intersects with a phenomenology of memory, it is 
always possible to find the prospect of a riposte to the law of mortal 
inevitability as primordially authentic. Ricoeur’s suggestion here is of a 
‘humble alternative of the meaning of mortality in which the reference to 
one’s own body requires a detour through biology and the return to the 
self by way of a patient appropriation of a knowledge entirely outside of 
the mere fact of death’ (350): a knowledge of birth, of the gift of life, of 
the resilience against the wounds of existence, of the ties of solidarity 
and recognition. This possibility can finally pave the way for a true 
historical awareness of the presence of death (of the self, of those close 
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to us, and among all these others, the dead of the past) in life. In the 
face of this philosophical possibility, a new positive dialogue with 
historical knowledge is made possible, as the privileged retrospective 
gaze of history offers to the absent ones of history ‘the pity of an offer 
of burial’5. But this can only be so at the difficult point where memory 
and history meet, only to mutually temper one another with regards to 
their hegemonic temptations6. 
 
3. The ontology of place 
The challenge is now to try to conceive of an ontology of place at the 
same level as the ontology of historicity, which Ricoeur begins to unfold 
in the way I have identified. 
Let us return to the suggestion that the existential of flesh, of the 
lived body, should have been deepened by Heidegger. Such a needed 
development would imply, in my view, the symmetrical development of 
an analysis of the spatial fabric of place in a double sense: first, as the 
dimension that constitutes itself around bodies and permeates each 
dynamic way of belonging to the world; but also, and foremost, as the 
genetic condition of the Da of Dasein, as it were. We are the sort of 
embodied being-in-the-world that we are – the sort of manipulating, 
thinking, remembering, experiencing, embodied creatures in-the-world 
                                                          
5 ‘The equation between writing and sepulchre would thus be proposed as the reply 
furnished by the discourse of the historian to the discourse of the philosopher’ (Ricoeur 
2004: 351). 
6 ‘On the one hand, history would like to reduce memory to the status of one object 
among others in its field of investigation; on the other hand, collective memory 
opposes its resources of commemoration to the enterprise of neutralizing lived 
significations under the distant gaze of the historian. Under conditions of retrospection 
common to history and to memory the contest of priority is undecidable. It is this very 
undecidability that is accounted for in an ontology responsible for its epistemic 
counterpart’ (Ib.). 
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that we are – only in virtue of our active engagement in place (Malpas, 
2004: 177) and, conversely, in virtue of what places themselves, as 
they become significant densifications of space, contribute to our way of 
being involved in those places.  
In this sense we might say that spatiality, as the possibility of 
emplacement, is a primordial dimension in which all aspects of human 
engagement in the world are actively rooted and can be unfolded: the 
mediation of one’s own identity, the relationship between different 
human beings, the relationship between humans and things of the world 
– all these connections are originally negotiated with the dense structure 
of places. If our way of capably being-in-the-world is to some extent 
assured by our embodied connectedness to specific places, and if the 
homo capax is “capable of making memory”, it must be added that the 
link we are talking about is also one that operates in memory and, 
consequently, in history (that is to say, in time) at a radical level: we do 
not remember ourselves or other people merely as abstract meanings or 
ideas of actions and decisions; we remember them (individually or 
collectively) as being emplaced. The people we remember are what they 
are because of their way of inhabiting, their way of belonging, their way 
of making place for themselves - but also, crucially, because of the ways 
in which the dynamics of place themselves materialize meaning and 
allow history to account for it, thus contributing to making each person, 
action or event who or what it is.   
If this is so, an ontology of place must then – and this is a second 
clue I would like to suggest – include research into an “authentic” 
conception of space. This research must – like Ricoeur’s research into 
human time – surpass the aporetic perspectives on space that tend to 
elude the point of rupture and suture, where “human space” (as a third 
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space between lived space and geometrical space) can truly be found. 
This research will confirm that it is the fabric of built spaces that forges 
the places we dwell. Ricoeur has shown quite convincingly the sense in 
which architecture and urbanism (civil, military) create the places we 
live in, that is to say where human time, in its historical and existential 
modes, takes place. Be it a building, a city, or a natural landscape that 
has been shaped by human actions, it is the human act of building in a 
broad sense that can change geological environments into meaningful 
lived or inhabited places in place. Therefore, something similar to what 
is said of the capacity for an ontology of temporality must be said of the 
spatial dimension of human dwelling when it comes to making possible 
(in an existential sense) the representation of the past by history and, 
before that, by memory (Ricoeur, 2004: 350): such an alignment, I 
would like to argue, will first of all show that the existential possibility of 
remembering is both temporal and spatial in the sense that no identity, 
no person, no action, no event of the past, and no time gone by is what 
it was outside the place that made it what it was. This means that the 
spatial dimension we are talking about is neither a psychological one nor 
a simple conception of localization in an inert positive extension. What I 
am arguing here is that any sense of the past implies the spatial 
dimension of emplacement, in the sense that the recuperation of the 
past by memory and, following that, by history equally needs a sense of 
place.  
This being so, a further dimension of an ontology of place can be 
unfolded following Ricoeur’s suggestion of “not privileging any dimension 
of time over the others”: to have a sense of place is, in fact, to 
understand all dimensions of time as equally authentic. In this way, we 
might say that “being-towards-a-place” is never the same as being-
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towards-death. Starting with the originality of belonging or being for 
somewhere means that any sense of time respects to situated, 
remembering persons as they interact within specific multi-layered 
spaces and particular locations, with concrete and material objects, 
environments, intersubjective relations and mundane presences. In this 
sense, to be emplaced is never merely to point to one dimension of 
time, because each place maintains our connection to several layers of 
being in the world. In place we are at home, and at home, in places that 
combine and connect several times, we build our lives (sometimes over 
our dead), we resist the wounds of existence, we make space in life for 
“our” dead and, at the same time, we celebrate each birth.  
The concreteness of places sustains the equal authenticity of all the 
dimensions of time, and for any situated individual a sense of the past 
will not be detached from the way in which present and future actions 
sometimes seem to be embedded in a complex history of old 
emplacements and ways of inhabiting. This is why we might say that – 
another clue – it is at the level of an ontology of place that the grounds 
for a point of intersection are first sketched, where memory and history 
meet and mutually temper one another with regards to their hegemonic 
temptations. In fact, if it is true that the past cannot be prised away 
from places – that is to say, away from the dwelling “stories” of 
someone’s embodied activity within particular spaces, as engaged with 
particular objects, environments, and other people – this connection 
must also be true with respect ‘both to the past that can be recounted 
as a part of a personal biography and to the past that is articulated 
through communal narrative and history’ (Malpas, 2004: 177) – neither, 
it must be added, ‘wholly independent of the other’ (180). This is to say 
that when we take places into account, we must begin by understanding 
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that they are indicative of many crossovers between space and time: 
time is spatialized, materialized, anchored and kept by objects, places 
and environments, such that it is possible to recover the past in 
embodied, shared ways (more or less familiar, more or less uncanny) of 
dwelling; and space, on the other hand is memorialised, densified, and 
dimensionalised in many layers of present, past and future actions, in 
this way becoming the possibility of dwelling that defines the human 
condition.  
 What must be added to this perspective is – as Ricoeur suggests – 
an extension of the idea of emplaced dwelling “to the level of the 
oikoumene”. In my view, this requires a development of the idea of 
home that is robust enough to allow “birth” and “hope” to riposte to 
Heidegger’s “being-towards-death”. From a spatial perspective, I find a 
first inspiration for this in Bachelard’s topoanalysis of the poetic image 
of inhabited spaces. As he develops this perspective, Bachelard notes 
that a home is ‘our first world’ (Bachelard, 1964: 4). Those who posit 
the universe as existing prior to the house qua home are therefore 
wrong. It is impossible, according to Bachelard, to know the universe 
before we know the “house”, and this means that we cannot truly know 
our world independently of a primordial sense of being at home. In a 
way, before being-towards-death we are born at home, and this is why 
we will never forget, as human beings, the constitutive archaic sense of 
the degree of intimacy and intensity that goes along with any 
experience of being in the world. If this is so, then it becomes necessary 
to understand that, ‘rather than claim[ing] that the world is a house’, 
Bachelard’s perspective ‘tries to convince us that the house is a world. It 
is a place-world, a world of places’ (Casey, 1997: 291) where time takes 
place in the inhabited house-world.   
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Regarding time, it is then important to underscore that memory on 
the one hand, and the care and depth that must nourish historical 
interpretations on the other, is partially lost, or at least damagingly 
blocked, if we lose sight of what only in and by the embodied, spatial, 
environmental or – to sum it all up – homely dimensions of existence 




A sense of the past is possible because we can become attached to what 
– at any time – wraps us up into its space by touching us almost 
physically. This is what can assure us that, as Ricoeur would say, 
memory can never be reduced to a ‘simple region of historical science’ 
(Ricoeur, 2004: 351), as if history itself were not rooted in a mémoire 
vivante. At the same time, it is also what can assure us that an 
emplaced ground of time – not one of simple commemorative sites, but 
one densified by objects, buildings, streets, ruins, atmospheres, and 
landscapes that carry within them the accumulated history of ancient 
labours and duties, of communities with their hopes, choices and 
decisions, of political and social experiences, of suffering and death – 
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